Bioethics: Discussion of sex selection, and genetic terminations

The November issue of Bioethics carries some interesting papers.

Zilberberg’s paper on sex selection argues:

‘Sex selection in India and China is fostered by a limiting social structure that disallows women from performing the roles that men perform, and relegates women to a lower status level. Individual parents and individual families benefit concretely from having a son born into the family, while society, and girls and women as a group, are harmed by the widespread practice of sex selection. Sex selection reinforces oppression of women and girls. Sex selection is best addressed by ameliorating the situations of women and girls, increasing their autonomy, and elevating their status in society. One might argue that restricting or prohibiting abortion, prohibiting sex selection, and prohibiting sex determination would eliminate sex selective abortion. But this decreases women’s autonomy rather than increases it. Such practices will turn underground. Sex selective infanticide, and slower death by long term neglect, could increase. If abortion is restricted, the burden is placed on women seeking abortions to show that they have a legally acceptable or legitimate reason for a desired abortion, and this seriously limits women’s autonomy. Instead of restricting abortion, banning sex selection, and sex determination, it is better to address the practice of sex selection by elevating the status of women and empowering women so that giving birth to a girl is a real and positive option, instead of a detriment to the parents and family as it is currently. But, if a ban on sex selective abortion or a ban on sex determination is indeed instituted, then wider social change promoting women’s status in society should be instituted simultaneously.’

Email:

Sex selection and restricting abortion and sex determination. Zilberberg J. Bioethics. 2007 Nov;21(9):517-9.

A paper by Rogers, Ballantyne and Draper gives an opposing view:

‘In this paper we argue that sex-selective abortion (SSA) cannot be morally justified and that it should be prohibited. We present two main arguments against SSA. First, we present reasons why the decision for a woman to seek SSA in cultures with strong son-preference cannot be regarded as autonomous on either a narrow or a broad account of autonomy. Second, we identify serious harms associated with SSA including perpetuation of discrimination against women, disruption to social and familial networks, and increased violence against women. For these reasons, SSA should be prohibited by law, and such laws should be enforced. Finally, we describe additional strategies for decreasing son-preference. Some of these strategies rely upon highlighting the disadvantages of women becoming scarce, such as lack of brides and daughters-in-law to care for elderly parents. We should, however, be cautious not to perpetuate the view that the purpose of women is to be the consorts for, and carers of, men, and the providers of children. Arguments against SSA should be located within a concerted effort to ensure greater, deeper social and cultural equality between the sexes.’

Department of Medical Education, Flinders University, Adelaide SA, Australia.

Is sex-selective abortion morally justified and should it be prohibited? Rogers W, Ballantyne A, Draper H. Bioethics. 2007 Nov;21(9):520-4.

Thachuk’s paper on prenatal testing and genetic terminations argues:

In North America, prenatal testing and genetic terminations are becoming clinically normalized. Yet despite this implied social acceptance, open discussions surrounding genetic terminations remain taboo and silenced. Women are socially isolated, their experiences kept secret, and their grief disenfranchised. The lack of social consensus regarding genetic terminations, the valorization of scientific knowledge, and the bioethical framing of the issue as a matter of personal choice and autonomy collectively serve to reify this silence. In many respects genetic screening offers a form of technological surveillance procuring security from the unwanted kind of child. Yet the manner in which ‘the unwanted kind of child’ is understood varies from context to context. While we carry with us the consequences of decisions made elsewhere, the institutionalized discourses upon which these decisions are made are not always so readily transportable. One must somehow reconcile ‘the unwanted kind of child’ of the biomedical model with ‘the unwanted kind of child’ who was to be a member of one’s family. In this paper, my intention is not to engage in the broader debate surrounding prenatal testing and genetic terminations. Rather, I employ my clinical encounters with these practices to illustrate the absence of an ethical language that might do justice to the experiences such practices construct. The limitations of a bioethical discourse that remains abstracted from lived experience are discussed.

Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada. Email:

The space in between: narratives of silence and genetic terminations. Thachuk A. Bioethics. 2007 Nov;21(9):511-4.