Why don’t abortion rates decline?

Ellie Lee puts abortion rates in their social context. 

Changes to birth rates are a noteworthy development of the past 40 years, with those of the past decade being the subject of great deal of both scholarly and more popular discussion.

In 2005 the Total Fertility Rate* (TFR) in the UK was 1.79 children per woman, a rise from 1.77 in 2004 and the fourth consecutive annual increase since the record low of 1.63 in 2001. (1) It is too early to know whether this constitutes a longer-term trend. However, it does not diminish the age-specific pattern, which is of a decline in fertility among women in their 20s, and an increase, though less sizeable, in the birth rate to those aged 35 and over.

The decline in fertility among women in their early 20s is a long-term trend, evident since the mid-1960s. For women in their late 20s, a trend to declining fertility is more recent, dating from the late 1980s. In general, fertility rates for older women have increased over the same period of time. During the 1970s, fertility rates were highest in the 20-24 and 25-29 year age groups, but throughout the 1980s and 1990s, women aged 25 to 29 had the highest fertility rates. Fertility rates at age 30-34 have increased steadily since the mid-1970s, and by 2004 the rates for women aged 30-34 exceeded those of women aged 25-29. (2)

The trend is towards not only delayed motherhood, but also childlessness. There has been an increase in the proportion of women remaining childless in each age cohort born since 1950. The proportion of women who would have no children at the end of their childbearing years (age 45) has risen from 11% of women born in 1940 to 18% of those born in 1960, the most recent cohort of women to have reached the end of their childbearing years. (3) For an increasing proportion of women, therefore, motherhood is either marginal throughout their lives, or for a longer period than before.

How can we understand these fertility patterns? What explanations have been offered for them? And what effect do they have on demand for abortion?

Childlessness

Childlessness has become a specific subject of discussion, particularly the extent to which childlessness may be understood as ‘voluntary’. Childlessness resulting from an active choice based on negative views towards having children, has been found to exist at lower levels than might be expected across Europe. (4) Fewer than 10% of women are childless by choice in all countries except Belgium and Austria, and in Britain the proportion is only 7- 8%at age 42. Men and women who are uncertain about whether to have children comprise a larger group: in Britain, 12% of women and 21% of men at 42, and one third of women and almost one half of men at age 30.

The relatively larger size of the group of those who are uncertain about whether to have children has led to the conclusion that ambivalence about childbearing and delay in making the decision about whether and when to have children plays a more dominant role than a definite decision to be ‘childfree’. Childbearing, it has been argued, is now very susceptible to situational factors (such as changes in the incidence of marriage) and to the social, economic and policy environment. Delaying having children and not having them at all are largely neither the result of circumstances entirely beyond individual control, such as the effects of war, nor for the most part the result of voluntarism. Rather, current fertility patterns can be best understood in relation to how individuals interact with range of factors that impact on experiences and perceptions of parenthood.

Employment

One aspect of the social and economic environment discussed in many studies of fertility is the increase in the percentage of women in employment. Women’s participation in the labour force is often on a part-time basis, and in certain sectors of the economy. But the number of women that expect to continue working through their adult lives has increased considerably.

The effect of this development on fertility is a source of debate. On the one hand, it is argued that there is an identifiable relationship between employment patterns and fertility patterns (5). While some argue that increased female participation in the labour force is almost inevitably linked with deferred childbearing, others see a more complex relationship between the changed position of women in regard to the labour force, and their postponement or rejection of parenthood. The British Social Attitudes Survey, for example, has suggested that it is ‘less than clear’ that fertility decisions and family life are taking second place to employment in the minds of the majority of women.

Qualitative research suggests that childless women are not mostly ‘driven by ambition’. The evidence challenges the notion that large numbers of women are manifestly placing their commitment to their paid work above having children. As Catherine Hakim notes, the fact that a high proportion of professional women remain childless may be the result of a drive to succeed at work. (6) However, these women constitute a ‘tiny fraction’ of those without children, since it is still the case that very few women reach top of their chosen profession. Childlessness, rather, is mostly accounted for by those in ‘middle and lower grade occupations’ who are by no means necessarily career-oriented, nor strongly rejecting of the prospect of eventually having children.

This is not to argue that changes to employment patterns are not important in explaining why fertility has declined, but to suggest that the relationship between fertility and employment is not straightforward. According to Fiona McAllister and Lynda Clarke, fertility outcomes may be better understood as a result of the interaction of employment with other trends, notably those relating to formation of partnerships. (7)

Marriage

Marriage patterns also impact on fertility. Marriage now happens in general later in life and less frequently. In England and Wales in 1971 the average age at first marriage was 25 for men and 23 for women; by 2005 this had increased to 32 and 29 respectively. (8) There has been a similar trend across Europe.

The proportion of people cohabiting has increased greatly significantly since the mid-1980s, and the Office for National Statistics notes that this may in part be related to people marrying later in life. The proportion of non-married men and women aged under 60 who were cohabiting in Great Britain more than doubled between 1986 and 2005, from 11% to 24% (men), and 13% to 24% (women). (9) Additionally the proportion of people living in couples of any kind, married or cohabiting is falling. The proportion of people living ‘solo’ has been identified as growing, as has ‘living together apart’, whereby partners choose to live in separate households. (10, 11)

These trends are significant for fertility in that non-marital relationships are more likely to be childless. Cohabitation has not simply replaced marriage in this regard. Qualitative research suggests that people who are married and non-married tend to have different expectations. In particular, women who are single are three to four times more likely to say they will remain childless than married women. (12) Ambivalence characterises choices relating to marriage just as it does those relating to having children.

In regard to both possible life events, it can be argued that a widespread perception has emerged in which the difficulty looms large of reaching a point of certainty about what is the best life choice, and whether or not to take on the responsibilities associated with certain choices.

Childcare

Public policies impacting on parenthood are also important in shaping fertility trends, primarily those affecting provision of childcare. (13) Social policies in regard to ‘family friendly working’ and childcare are likely to make little difference to the ‘childfree’, but may have a significant effect for the numerically larger group that is uncertain about childbearing. Fertility outcomes are likely to be affected to some degree at least by policies relating to availability of childcare, working arrangements and maternity leave.

Policy may also influence fertility through its reflection and amplification of themes associated with the problem of ‘parenting’. The nature of parent-child interactions has been placed increasingly under the spotlight, and policy has been shaped with this in mind. Increasing credence has been given to the notion that the experience of the ‘early years’ is decisive for a person’s future development, and as a result, emphasis on the ‘early years’ now strongly influences the agenda for childcare policy. This in turn has given added impetus to the idea that it is far better for pregnancies to be planned and wanted, thus impacting on reproductive health policy.

Little research specifically addresses the extent to which ideas about ‘parenting’ influence decisions regarding having children. However, a focus on parenting may have heightened concerns about being ‘good enough parents’, increasing a sense of uncertainty about when is the ‘right time’ to take on what might now seem to be a considerable challenge.

Conclusions

The current context is one in which women have fewer children than before and later in life; where cohabitation and solo living are more commonplace; where a very high primacy is placed on pregnancies being planned and wanted; where women expect, and are expected to, take on responsibilities other than motherhood through their 20s; and where ‘parenting’ has come to viewed as a skill that is demanding and needs to be acquired rather than something that ‘comes naturally’. It is unsurprising given all of this that abortion rates fail to decline. Abortion has come to be perceived as a choice that can be considered when unplanned pregnancies occur, in a way that has not been the case previously.

Dr Ellie Lee is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, University of Kent, and co-ordinator of Pro-Choice Forum.  This is an updated and edited extract from Ellie Lee’s chapter in K. Wellings and A. Glasier (eds) (2005). Contraception and Contraceptive Use. London: RCOG Press. It is also published in the Spring 2008 print edition of Abortion Review. Download the print edition here.

* The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for a given year is the average number of children per woman a group of women would have if they experienced the age-specific fertility rates in the given year for their entire childbearing years.

References

(1) Office for National Statistics (2007). Social Trends 37, p6
(2) Office for National Statistics (2007). Social Trends 37, p21
(3) Office for National Statistics (2007). Social Trends 37, p21
(4) Hakim, C. (2004) Childlessness in Europe. Summary of Research Results for the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) project funded by research grant RES-000-23-0074, running December 2002-July 2003 [unpublished].
(5) Jensen, TK, Anderson, AN and Skakkbaek, NE. (2004) ‘Is human fertility declining?’ International Congress Series 1266: 32-44
(6) Hakim, C. (2004) Childlessness in Europe. Summary of Research Results for the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) project funded by research grant RES-000-23-0074, running December 2002-July 2003 [unpublished].
(7) McAllister, F with Clark L (1998) Choosing childlessness. London: Family Policy Studies Centre.
(8) Office for National Statistics (2007). Social Trends 37, p18
(9) Office for National Statistics (2007). Social Trends 37, p19
(10) Centre for family Research. Solo Living (ongoing research); 2004 [http://www.crfr.ac.uk/Research/sololiving.htm]
(11) Drew, E. (1998). Re-conceptualising Families. In: Drew, E, Emerek, R and Mahon, E, editors. Women, work and the family in Europe. London and New York: Routledge.
(12) McAllister, F with Clark L (1998) Choosing childlessness. London: Family Policy Studies Centre.
(13) McDonald, P (2000) ‘Gender Equity, Social Institutions and the Future of Fertility’. Journal of Population Research 17(1): 1-16.